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“When managers act, their thinking occurs concurrently with action. Thinking is not 
sandwiched between activities; rather, it exists in the form of circumspection present when 
activities are executed” (Weick 1984, p. 223) 
 
“I am not suggesting that good teachers act without thought. But we have 
not really examined what the nature is of this “thought” (van Manen 2008, p. 11). 
 
Introduction and problem 
The terms reflection and intuition are conspicuously prominent and dominant in management 
research. In a variety of ways these concepts crops up in everything from management 
research on decision making processes (March and Simon, 1966), sense-making (Weick 
1979), information-processing (Simon 1979), learning cycle (Kolb 1984), reflective 
practitioner (Schon 1983), mindfulnes (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001), experiential learning 
(Korthagen 2005), expert intuition management (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986), strategizing 
(Mintzberg et. al 1998), pedagogical tact (van Manen 1995) etc. More concrete, ‘reflection’ 
and ‘intuition’ are ambiguous terms and the relationship between them, critical to both 
‘strategic management’ and ‘knowledge management’, is unclear. If ‘intuition’ is inherently 
non-verbalizable in expert decisions (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986) and strategizing (Mintzberg 
et.al 1998) and if ‘reflection’ is almost impossible (Kroksmark & Johansen 2003) or very 
difficult to achieve in instant practice (van Manen 1995), there seem to be little space left for 
other perspectives which may link intuition and reflection in a more dialogical way. 
      One of the dominant ways of dealing with ambiguous phenomena of management 
knowledge/knowing is undertaken by separation and differentiation. For example, the 
personal, context-bound and dynamic definition of knowledge is often allocated to categories 
labeled ‘implicit’, ‘tacit and ‘intuitive’ whereas the impersonal, context-free and static side is 
allocated to a categories labeled ‘explicit’, ‘analytical’ and ‘reflective’ (see Tsoukas 2003, 
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Stacey 2001, Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). It may be argued that this differentiation is 
supportive as long as results (theoretical and empirical) are not presented in an additive 
manner. A way to address such a dualistic and dichotomized view is to think in terms of 
contradictory meanings simultaneously. This is what Bakhtin (1986) terms ‘loopholes’. As an 
attitude, this always already (unsolvable) solution is attractive, and it may serve to justify the 
motivation behind this paper. This motivation challenges the tacit/intuitive-explicit/reflective 
knowledge dichotomies which tend to leave out all the shades of grey in between. 
      It is possible that this kind of dichotomised logic, like a colonising impulse, exercises an 
excessive influence on our view of what ‘good management’ ought to be. This dichotomised 
logic may be supported by the fact that our society places considerable emphasis on 
rationality and efficiency, which means that analytical assessments and (detached) reflection 
often receives more attention than personal commitment and embodied intuitive skills 
(Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, MacIntyre 1985, Toulmin 2001). In my view, there is reason to 
believe that this colonizing impulse derives some of its legitimacy from a dichotomised view 
of reflection and intuition. If this suggestion is correct, there are grounds to show the 
significance of one alternative framework which may stem from the shades of grey and 
loopholes. 
      From the shades of grey a conceptual framework of ‘reflective-intuition-knowing’ (R-I-K) 
as a knowing-making process is presented, which links the distinct reflective and intuitive 
forms of knowledge. This proposes a (radical) challenge with regard to a new (R-I-K) 
conceptualization of ‘here and now’ management practice partly based on two forms of 
knowledge which traditionally has been dichotomized. In short, either when an (unexpected) 
problem occurs in the managerial ‘here and now’ situation or that a situation demands an 
answer, (expert) managers may deploy a reflective-intuition (R-I) by means of an intuitive 
grasp/awareness and simultaneous reflection during the course of the situation which guide 
further action, or reframing the problem and modifying ongoing practice in such a way that 
managerial knowing and good decisions still take place. R-I reflects the on-the-spot way of 
‘thinking’ more profoundly or in other ways, ways that open the world and guide managers in 
it. 
      Illustrative examples for this R-I-K framework is reviewed and its trustworthiness 
tentatively established. Examples of ‘reflective-intuition-knowing’ intend to show how 
reflective and intuitive-process are interwoven ‘here and now’, and it is proposed that the 
transmutation of ‘reflection’ and ‘intuition’ ‘knowledge’ into R-I-K involves three specific, 
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interwoven and dialogical modes (abductive, deductive and inductive) of management 
practice. Such a transmutation and synthesis could begin amongst teachers themselves, and 
the examples in this paper pertain to the practice of teachers. Moreover, viewing the teacher 
as a manager of strategic decision, knowledge and interpretation allows the R-I-K to be 
viewed as viable for the practice of teaching and for teacher training.  
      In this paper I draw on recent progress in the perspectives of knowledge- and strategic 
management and decision-making to frame and develop a framework of R-I managerial 
knowing. In addition to tying together elements of the theory of these areas, this analysis casts 
new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the management literature 
including the definition of the (tacit-explicit) knowledge concept, the managerial decision 
making process (rational-intuitive), the importance of unsecure and open-ended ‘here and 
now’ situations and the dialogical character of management practice. I believe such a 
perspective will contribute to a better theoretical understanding of the complex 
knowledge/knowing involved in management. This is one step of enhancing our theoretical 
sensitivity towards how the interwoven aspects of R-I can improve managerial practice and 
knowing. A greater understanding of the actionable and diverse aspects of R-I knowledge 
opens up the potential for improved research on the use of knowledge in management. Seeing 
R-I knowing as a intertwined and complex phenomenon has the potential to more fully reveal 
it’s manageability. It can also be helpful to managers as a tool to manage and run their 
everyday work and projects more efficiently. First, this paper presents the rationale and 
features behind the ‘theory of reflective-intuitive knowing’. Second, a literature review is 
presented in order to shed light on and frame the phenomenon of R-I-K. Thereafter 
illustrations of how R-I-K modes such as abductive, deductive and inductive inferences works 
are given. Finally, theoretical and practical implications for re-searching R-I-K management 
are described.  
 
Theoretical framework 
Based on aspects from different philosophical texts of Heidegger, Polanyi and Peirce the 
theoretical framework of R-I-K are presented. More specifically drawing upon Heidegger’s 
texts (1962, 1977, 1993) Being and Time, The question concerning Technology and What is 
Metaphysics? it’s possible to show some aspects of how R-I-K can be a condition for 
knowing and existence in scientific management approaches such as strategy- and knowledge 
management . Moreover, due to this negligence of the meaning of Being, man (the 'who' of 
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everyday Dasein is Das Man or man) has lost almost all his connections with Being and lives 
now in a technical and artificial world (Heidegger 1962, 1977, 1993). That is to say, man has 
lost his ground and is not-at-home anymore. By taking the question of Being as the clue, 
Heidegger (1962) is concerned about the Being behind all beings or entities, which can be 
grasped by the self-understanding of Dasein (human being). The human being (Dasein) is 
always already (being-in-the-world) in a process of opening entities into our world 
involvement. In this way we categorically perceive entities as entities either as themselves or 
as something they are not, but always for-the-sake of some circumspective activity 
(Heidegger 1977). It is being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein) and this perception ‘for-the-
sake’ of which also may constitute R-I or the experience of R-I. 
      The question that needs to be explored much further is “precisely how do these 
R-I become available to us?” The explanation proposed is largely as a result of a reading of 
Heidegger (1927), especially his notion of a horizon of understanding, or significance, which 
constitutes a pre-cognitive capacity that efficiently, and without conscious effort, is able to 
generate a context for our being-in-the-world. The interesting point is that Heidegger 
characterizes this as a circumspection, by which he means a casting around for interpretations 
and meaning. It may be that R-I are one of the most advanced examples of this at work, that is 
to say we are thrown into the future. In other words, R-I may exemplify that we are always 
already ahead of ourselves. This may also be a fruitful contribution to Polanyis’ (1966 p. 4) 
words that we know more than we can telli. 
      When this notion of R-I circumspection is taken up together with Polanyi’s (1962) idea of 
tacit knowing then perhaps a much clearer picture starts to emerge. The central idea in 
Polanyi’s philosophy is what he has called the tacit dimension (Polanyi, 1962, 1966). His 
basic proposal is that all knowledge involves personal knowing, and that knowledge is either 
tacit or is rooted in the tacit (Polanyi, 1969). He characterizes human knowing as 
“participation through indwelling” (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p. 44), and that “since all 
understanding is tacit knowing, all understanding is achieved by indwelling”(Polanyi, 1969, 
p.160). The point is that the understanding of managers R-I circumspections may be sharper 
focusing on not only on what is known explicitly, but also on what is known tacitly, i.e. at a 
pre-cognitive and subsidiary awareness level, sometimes outside of our focal awareness. As 
Polanyi (1962) says; “The structure of tacit knowing is then the structure of this integrative 
process, and knowing is tacit to the extent to which it has such a structure. ... tacit knowing  
cannot be strictly opposed to focal knowing” (p. 602). To be more precise, it is the relation 
between the tacit underpinning (subsidiary awareness) and the explicit focus (focal 
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awareness) of knowing that is important. So, it’s this integration or relational character of 
knowing which is the tacit dimension.      
      Moreover, what crucially underpins the R-I knowing-making process is a participatory 
(being-in-the-world) and relational knowing (subsidiary and focal awareness). Furthermore, I 
propose the use of R-I in this respect, as involving a process of abductive, deductive and 
inductive inferences, described by Peirce (1958). 
      Peirce (1958) wish to show how it is possible to make new discoveries and knowledge in 
a methodologically and logically way. Translated into management practice abduction 
(firstness) plays the role of generating new ideas or hypotheses; deduction (secondness) 
functions as evaluating the hypotheses; and induction (thirdness) is justifying of the 
hypothesis with empirical data.  
      Abduction, as the first core concept, constitutes, according to Peirce (1958), the first stage 
of any scientific investigation, and of all interpretative processes (paragraph 6. 469). The very 
basis for abduction is our examination of a certain number of facts. We attempt to sort out the 
facts in order to attain an idea of what we find before us. The phase of abduction consists of 
unexplained or surprising phenomena. According to Peirce (1958, p. 315), the person at stake 
or the manager/teacher can reach this abductive hypothesis by genuine doubt. For Peirce 
(1958), doubt takes rise from surprise or as he says: “genuine doubt always has an external 
origin, usually from surprise”. In other words, finding an answer to managerial problems 
requires a certain amount of creativity: “it is the idea of putting together what we had never 
before dreamed of putting together which flashes the new suggestion before our 
contemplation” (Peirce, 1958, paragraph 5. 181). The possible abductive explanatory 
hypotheses reveal a path from facts to ideas and theory, or expressed differently: the 
abductive hypotheses seek theory and deduction. 
      After the abductive steps have brought us to selected theories that may be fitted to explain 
the facts, we find ourselves, according to Peirce (1958), on the deductive level. The second 
core concept, deduction, or the deductive mode, is based on theory and the theory’s 
hypotheses. Deduction involves drawing logical consequences from premises. An inference is 
endorsed as deductively valid when the truth of all premises guarantees the truth of 
conclusion. This may correspond to when the manager is introduced to a rule or a theory 
which aims at gaining understanding of a surprising fact. In this way, deduction, like 
abduction, contributes to a conceptual understanding of the phenomenon of empirical facts. 
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      Deduction cannot produce new hypotheses or assumptions, because it is fundamentally 
self-referring. It is important to bear in mind that this kind of reasoning cannot lead to the 
discovery of knowledge that is not already embedded in the premise (Peirce, 1958). However, 
Peirce (1958) in line with the inventor of deductive syllogisms, Aristotle, did not isolate 
formal logic from external reality and they repeatedly admitted the importance of induction. 
This ‘only exclusive deduction’ thinking is not endorsed by the Peircean philosophical 
system, which emphasizes the search for a deeper insight of a surprising fact by the help of 
the interconnected terms of abduction, deduction and induction. 
      Inductive logic is often based upon the notion that probability is the relative frequency in 
long run and a general law can be concluded based on numerous cases. Peirce (1958) uses the 
example of an investigator who starts from a hypothesis and tries to test it, elaborating some 
conditional predictions out of it. To assess the hypothesis, the investigator must judge and 
estimate the combined value of the evidence. Accordingly, the teacher must handle classroom 
situations and judge if they are reasonable compared to facts such as grades. Induction may 
shed light on important interpretations, interpretations that in some way reflect what is 
actually going on in the management and classroom practice. Clearly, a strategy that is 
faithful to the everyday realities, where surprisingly facts are carefully induced from empiri, 
can ensure that theory (deduction) is closely related to the daily significant opportunities 
which may be discovered. 
      It may seem hasty and unjustified to combine such different thinkers as Heidegger, 
Polanyi and Peirce under an umbrella called R-I-K. Even though there’s not enough space 
here to elaborate on the issue, some remarks can be made. For example, aspects of abduction 
may appear more commonsensical when seen in connection with Polanyi's account of tacit 
knowing with its emphasis upon indwelling and two forms of awareness (see Mullins 2002). 
In sum, to further explore the connection between Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, Peirce's 
abduction and Polanyi's tacit knowing may not only suggest some new ways to appreciate the 
resonant depths of these thinkers, but it may also contribute to a more profound understanding 
of R-I as a phenomenon. 
      A tentative framework of R-I circumspection may rest on a (embodied) precognitive 
capacity by which managers may generate abductive-deductive-inductive plausible ‘here and 
now’ accounts of their experience. R-I therefore can be seen to be the crucial means by which 
managers simultaneously use reflection and intuition in a three-fold way. These concepts may 
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describe new bearing internal patterns both on a theoretical level as well as in the reality of 
management practice. The purpose is not to build ontologically models, but to understand 
real-life practice, i.e. how knowing are abducted or created and inductively or deductively 
discovered in a variety of here and now situations and for different reasons. Within academic 
literature it is possible to further frame the R-I-K perspective.    
Literature review      
Since the literature on management research is extensive, I will choose research and 
theoretical perspectives which may frame the need for a more profound understanding and 
more studies on reflective-intuition-knowing in managerial practice. Literature within 
different areas such as strategic management, knowledge management and decision making 
(psychology) are considered. 
Strategy and knowledge management 
The strategy management literature is characterized by dichotomies such as content-process, 
formulation-implementation, thinking-acting, intended-emergent, foresight-uncertainty 
(Jarzabkowski 2005). These theoretical dichotomies may have more or less relevance for in 
situ practice. Mintzberg (1998), in his study of the nature of managerial work, show that in 
many instances managers do not appear to use a rational systematic, a priori step-by-step 
approach to decision making.  Moreover, Mintzberg (1994: 321) as a forerunner for the 
strategy-as-practice approach argue strongly that, “Indeed, the whole nature of strategy 
making - dynamic, irregular, discontinuous, calling for groping, interactive processes with an 
emphasis on learning and synthesis - compels managers to favor intuition. This is probably 
why all those analytical techniques of planning felt so wrong. ... Ultimately, the term 
"strategic planning" has proved to be an oxymoron.” It seems like Mintzberg favourise 
intuition perhaps on the expense of analytical reflection and ‘here and now’ reflection. In 
Mintzberg’s (1994) view reflection and intuition are not simultaneously aspects of managerial 
knowing. Here, the R-I practice/examples under investigation is narrowed and focused on 
strategizing as emergent action ‘on-the-spot’ that incorporates both thinking/reflection and 
intuitive awareness. However, while sharing Mintzbergs turn to studying strategy less as a 
means to an end and more as a (emergent) phenomenon in itself, this is not just the preserve 
of Mintzberg. The turn seems to be gathering momentum under the label of strategy-as-
practice (Whittington, 1996; Hendry, 2000; Jarzabkowski, 2003). The strategy-as-practice 
perspective  highlight the need to understand practitioners and the resources they draw on to 
perform their work (Balogun et al, 2007; Jarzakowski et al, 2007; Jarzabkowski, 2004; 
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Johnson et al, 2003; Whittington, 2006). In line with this approach I agree that research needs 
to focus more on what it is managers actually do ,or to be more precise; i.e. to focus on what 
is the nature of ‘thought’ in the midst of action (as van Manen 1998 highlights in the opening 
lines) . Maybe no research has as yet taken this argument seriously enough to explore the 
relationships between managers strategic action, their R-I tacit knowing or their ability to 
develop context sensitive interpretations and actions. Moreover, the strategic perspective 
holds that managers engage in sense making in order to make strategic 
judgements about change.  
      In concordance with much research on sense making which stress the unexpected cycles 
of interpretation and action (Weick 1995), R-I major concern also is the unforeseen (problem 
based) reflective processes and interpretative cycles. For example Mangham & Pye (1991) 
refer to these cycles of “reading context” to decide what to do, and “acting to have impact” as 
“sense reading” and “sense writing”. The framework of R-I-K follows this main 
(hermeneutical) message, but take a closer look at R-I-K situated in ‘here and now’ action-
demanding situations. Much research on sense making has focused on the context of sense 
making, with a primary concern for organizational processes of sense making (for example, 
Gioia & Longenecker, 1994; Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007). As a result perhaps 
less is known about how managers as individuals perform their sense making roles, or what I 
would call R-I-K, and it is this gap this research starts to address. The focus on individual 
performance shows how managers reciprocally act within and shape their sense making 
context through their practical knowledge. This also enables the findings of R-I examples and 
theory to contribute to the sense-making and strategy-as-practice research agenda since it’s 
possible to unpick some linkages between strategic practice, R-I knowing and performance. 
      With regard to the knowledge management as well as the strategic literature one of the 
most commonly used distinction is between knowledge that has been made explicit, and the 
knowledge that remains tacit (Tsoukas 2003; Gourlay 2006). We seem to owe it to the initial 
(misinterpreted) influence of Polanyis’ epistemological project (1958) and, following more 
recently, to the influence of Japanese authors such as Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). This 
paper is concerned with extending what we know about how teachers manage their strategic 
practice from a tacit knowing perspective through viewing the teacher partly in terms of what 
Orlikowski (2002) calls “knowledgeable performance”, or “effective action” and partly in 
terms of what Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) names “situational responses” and “intuitive 
judgment”. In addition I try to show that the argument “tacit and explicit knowledge are 
mutually constituted … inseparable” (Tsoukas, 1996: 14), may be justified or shown in an R-
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I-K framework. The R-I concept suggests that all our knowledge (tacit/intuition and 
explicit/reflection) can be exercised in practice. Hence, R-I aims at questioning the dominant 
and dichotomy (tacit-explicit) view of knowledge in management literature. This can be done 
by looking at how the different aspects (abductive, deductive, inductive) of knowing are (not) 
used by the teacher. Thus here the term “tacit knowing” may be used to capture the notion of 
R-I knowing as something intimately linked to and wrapped up in doing and actionable ‘here 
and now’ knowledge. This may help to emphasise the nature of the tacit knowing seen in 
managers R-I interpretative actions and castings, but rarely examined in detail.   
Decision making  
Historically, reflection and intuition in management has been discussed in light of two 
different models which I choose to call the systematic-analytical model and the intuitive-skill 
model. There are many variants of theories and very different projects within these two 
models, but the difference between them represents dualities between theory/reflection and 
practice/intuition. The roots of these dualities in the western world stem in a variety of ways 
from i.e. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and not at least Descartes’ philosophy.   
      Maybe one approach dominate in management research within the systematic-analytical 
stance, namely an decision making theory often underpinned by information-processing 
theory. Analytical decision making theory assumes that rational analytical thinking precedes 
action. The analysis is a systematic step-by-step procedure with the use of logical rules that 
can be followed until a decision is made. The information-processing model is a 
psychological theory much used in research in medical decision making and characterized by 
a scientific approach to making decisions. It is also termed the hypothetico-deductive 
approach. Hamers et. al. (1994) described four major stages of this process in nursing as, 
gathering preliminary clinical information about the patient, generating tentative hypotheses 
about the patients’ condition, interpreting the initially registered cues in light of the tentative 
hypotheses, and weighing the decision alternatives before choosing the one that fits best in 
light of the evidence collected. Earlier knowledge acquired about the situation at hand is 
included in this process.  
      In the last two decades research on intuition became significantly more popular in the 
management literature (e.g. Akinci and Sadler-Smith 2012). A major contribution of this 
interest which more generally reflects an increasingly interest in the academic diciplines is 
represented by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986).  The intuitive-skill model is probably best known 
in (expert) management through Dreyfus’s work (for a more comprehensive and profound 
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categorication of intuition in management research see Dörfler and Ackermann 2012). 
Intuition has been defined in several ways, for example “understanding without a rationale” 
(Benner and Tanner 1987, p. 23) or “a perception of possibilities, meanings and relationships 
by way of insight” (Gerrity, 1987, p. 64). According to Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), expert 
intuition is rooted in the ability to recognize patterns of cues. For example, this is an ability 
that develops with experience in managing patients in the nursing field. According to 
Thompson (1999), the basic idea of the intuitive-skill model is that “intuitive judgment 
distinguishes the expert from the novice, with the expert no longer relying on analytical 
principles to connect their understanding of the situation to appropriate action” (p.1224). 
      While reviewing the literature on intuition  two recurring themes have been prominent 
when discussing the benefits of intuitive decision making (Dane & Pratt, 2004; Isenberg, 
1984; Gladwell, 2005; Myers, 2002; Kahneman, 2002; Miller & Ireland, 2005): 1)Its speed 
compared to logical decision making: 2) Its usefulness in novel or unfamiliar settings. R-I 
may share the benefits of intuitive decision making with regard to speed and it’s usefulness in 
novel or more open-ended (interpretative) situations. However, R-I may collapse under the 
same “speed and novel” conditions, and perhaps the mode of R-I in a certain degree depends 
on how time and the novel are subjectively perceived.         
      The analytical and intuitive decision making models have ardent followers and have often 
been viewed as two distinct types of cognitive activity sharply separated. However, since the 
late 1990s, a third approach to decision making has been discussed in the management 
literature, decision making based on the cognitive continuum theory (CCT) by Hammond 
(1996).   
      According to Cognitive Continuum Theory, there are multiple modes of cognition that lie 
on a continuum between intuition and analysis. Cognition often falls between the end points 
and thereby includes properties of both analysis and intuition, referred to as quasi-rational 
cognition. Quasi rationality is the prevalent mode of cognition, meaning that many judgment 
tasks present cues that induce an oscillation between analytical and intuitive cognition. A 
major tenet of the theory is that “judgment is a joint function of task properties and cognitive 
properties” (p. 83), that is, different judgment tasks should be solved through different 
cognitive processes. This theory describes differences among judgment tasks and locates them 
in relation to cognitive properties along the cognitive continuum. A judgment task that 
involves uncertainty is difficult to break down into distinct components and may benefit from 
a more intuitive approach than a judgment task that is well structured with few and 
recognizable cues. The latter judgment task would favor a more analytical approach.  
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       Using Cognitive Continuum Theory, it’s possible to recognize when quasi rationality may 
outperform analysis and intuition. Even though in different ways, R-I-K theory and quasi 
rationality may shed light on the need for a more refined theoretical framework than 
dichotomized views of analysis and intuition. 
Example of R-I-K in teacher practice 
The case: The teacher needs to check out the results of poor grades for her class which 
stem form external evaluations and censorship. In this case the teacher is faced with 
evaluations which contradicts her sense of that the teaching where successful. The 
successful experience are due to the teachers purpose ‘to see’ every student both literally 
and figuratively. She tries as best she can to give recognition in the classroom to every 
student; not only recognition for an accomplishment, but recognition of who the student 
is, even who he can become. She keeps her eye on students and the challenges they has 
set for themselves.  In addition to her own experience, she has also received many 
positive feedbacks from both students and colleagues with regard to her attentive 
teaching style. Here there’s confusing data at an inductive (empirical) level. The reality 
perceived by the teacher does not correspond to the poor evaluation. On the background 
of these contradicting inductive ‘evidence’ the teacher seeks a tentative explanation. 
When the teacher is situated in the classroom again she brings these questions into play. 
While conducting her teaching she ask herself; “is this working out? Do the students 
really understand my teaching? What is the best way of dealing with this right now?” 
      A syllogism for the above-mentioned classroom teacher would look as follows: 
Premise: A phenomenon consisting of apparently multiple, positive and promising 
learning and teaching activities in the classroom has been observed (from the teachers 
perspective). In contrast poor grades are presented by external reviewers (x1).   
   
Premise: Among the various explanatory hypotheses are: (a) The teacher experience that 
her activity makes visible demands, and challenges the students through dialogue and 
questions, but maybe what you see (teaching) is not necessarily what’s happening 
(learning); (b) the students’ own effort or individual work does not create a decisive 
basis for learning activities; (c) the pupils’ dialogue among each other is not sufficient to 
develop positive learning activities. For the teacher, (a) is the hypothesis that can best 
explain x1. 
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Conclusion: There is thus reason to pursue (a). 
 
The syllogism example demonstrates the teachers creative organisation of the 
empirical facts. According to Peirce (1960, p. 315), the teacher can reach this 
self-evident hypothesis by the presence of genuine doubt. For Peirce (1960), doubt takes 
rise from surprise or as he says: “genuine doubt always has an external origin, usually 
from surprise” (Paragraph 5. 443). Genuine doubt occurred in light of the paradoxical 
‘results’ of teacher practice, and now the teacher is trying to look at what is going on in 
front of her, trying to use R-I in the midst of action to make decisions that would allow 
them to foster as much success as possible out of what is going on.  
      Deductive-hypothetical conceptualisation in the classroom is necessary (but not 
sufficient) to deduce systematic, experiential consequences or theoretical working 
hypotheses. For example the teacher wasn’t sure about this girl. She is often is looking 
elsewhere, and doing other things (D), but the teacher assumed she gets things anyway 
(E). This must be checked out. And this guy who is back there is very, very bright and 
often physically elsewhere also (F), but doesn’t miss a trick the teacher assumed (E) . 
This must be tested. In a syllogism, this can be articulated as follows: 
 
Premise: In theory, all cases of D are interwoven with E. 
Premise: In theory, F situations are interwoven with E cases. 
Conclusion: In theory, F and D are therefore interwoven cases. 
 
The classroom teacher is here carrying out a deductive operation that, based on 
the premises, draws the logical conclusions. It is important to recall that this does 
not involve any new applicable knowledge, because the conclusions, that is, being 
able to apply the concepts together, are implicit in the premises. In other words, the 
general hypotheses; What you see is not necessarily what’s happening, is being 
(theoretically) tested. These hypotheses and consequences are now integrated in the 
circumspective activity in ‘here and now’ situations in the classroom. Thereafter the 
teacher carries out a systematically testing, relatively long-term and theoretical analysis 
of the classroom’s empirical facts. For instance: 
 
Premise: D1, D2, D3 … D100 is E. 
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Premise: D1, D2, D3 … D100 is F. 
Conclusion: E is therefore also F. 
 
This syllogism shows that the teacher has applied a deductive term in order to 
categorise the empirical facts. With sufficient field observation time, the classroom 
teacher has thus classified the frequency of 30 (deductively assumed) cases and 
found a concordance between the deductive theoretical and inductive empirical 
world. This may indicate that the R-I in some way reflect what is actually going on in the 
classroom. An R-I mode that is faithful to the everyday realities, where substantive 
learning areas are carefully induced from empiri, can ensure that the teachers perceived 
‘teaching reality’ (theory) is closely related to (the lack of) students daily significant 
learning realities. So, the teacher are perhaps not mistaken concerning that the students 
learning (based on two cases) are not so poor as the extern evaluation might indicate. 
Clearly, just two inductive occurrences are not sufficient to reject the extern evaluation 
with poor grades, but the teacher may be more tentative confident that major ‘error’ is 
not her own style of attentive teaching.  
      Summarized the case starts with the teachers’ intuitive awareness when hard data 
(poor grades by external censorship) does not feel quite right (inductive mode). ‘Here 
and now’ R-I allows the teacher too doubt (abductive mode), elaborate working 
hypotheses (deductive mode) and seek more information or look at what data we do 
have in a different angle in the midst of action (inductive mode). During the short period 
of classroom teaching she has undergone in the following order inductive, abductive, 
deductive and inductive processes on the spot while conducting teaching. This can be 
conceptualised as R-I shown as a dialogical I-A-D-I mode. 
      For Peirce (1958), abduction, deduction and induction do not constitute a static 
order, but follow in a transformative and dialogical order during the interpretative 
process. Introduction of the concepts into an interpretative R-I process acts to raise 
awareness in the teacher practice. More specifically, the use of theory (teacher’s 
perception of her own teaching) can, subsequent to the analysis of inductive empirical 
facts, be corrected by abductive processes. Abduction can thus not only directly 
influence the selection of (theory) deductive consequences, but also ensure that the 
theoretical world (the teacher’s hypotheses of her own teaching) is developed further in 
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accordance with the empirical one (the students learning). 
       Hypothetically, at this point, the teacher is faced with three choices. She: (a) pass 
over and ignore this type of abductive process and allow the extern evaluation to emerge 
as the dominant constructive factor; (b) reject her theory because of possible biased 
focus; or (c) she can modify the theory such that both the extern evaluation and her 
teaching can direct the analysis of the students learning process. In this case, the 
classroom teacher selects the latter alternative, (c). 
      One important premise of the framework of R-I-K emphasise the teachers’ spatial 
‘here and now’ location. On the basis of the example, the teacher must rely on periodical 
and systematic observations of learning activities in the classroom. In accordance with 
the issue to be examined, the classroom is the physical point of departure for an 
interpretative activity. The quality of the abductive, deductive and inductive hypotheses 
is in other words based on the teachers’ physical presence and observation in the 
classroom. This physical presence enables the teachers’ horizon of understanding or a    
circumspective activity involving casting around for interpretations and meaning. 
 
Theoretical and practical implications 
Theoretical remarks 
There are both theoretical insights and practical or managerial implications which can be 
drawn from the R-I-K framework. It is important to stress that “only reflective intuitions, in 
other words, intuitions that are informed in situ by a cautious examination of the reflective 
significance of intuitive aspects, are to be taken into consideration” (Åsvoll 2012, p. 13). 
Although many teachers and managers can become reflective-intuitive, some do not. This 
might be due to many factors, ie. barriers concerning local culture not encouraging reflection 
(Russel 1993) and experienced lack of( reflection) time in action demanding situations (van 
Manen 1995) etc. There seem to be more factors contra reflection and especially R-I than pro. 
And it’s important to note that such reflection is not an aim in itself. Molander (2008) shed 
light on this saying that; 
“because reflection is as fallible as other ways of gaining knowledge, it is not at all certain 
that a reflective or reflected practice is better than a non-reflective one. It depends on how 
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well the reflection processes have managed to improve the overall knowledge (in action) of 
the agent(s) in question” (p. 20). 
Translated to R-I, that is to say, R-I is not an aim in itself. R-I is not self-validating or self-
justifying. As stated by Molander (2008) “no type of reflection can claim infallibility” (p. 21). 
In my view R-I must sometimes rest on an unpredictable and ‘not-at-home’ way of being-in-
the-world. However, management practice that do not allow time for R-I could end up as non 
learning practices. My thesis is that management practice needs managers who can be R-I at 
the right time, and at best, only at the right time. This thesis stress the need for further 
research within the perspective of R-I tacit knowing. There are different ways of pursuing 
such a research further. One way of pursuing this research (which I personally would prefer) 
is by a phenomenological approach. I think a phenomenology of reflective intuition must 
proceed essentially by examples. Is there anything that may be called “phenomenological 
reflective intuition”? Yes, I think. Maybe a precondition for an R-I phenomenology is that 
there should be a necessity of immediate action based on an interwoven reflective (abduction, 
deduction and induction) intuition (subsidiary awareness). Even though what is immediate or 
not depends very much on the practice in question, and there is never only one true 
description, R-I may be relevant to show some of the varieties and complexities of 
management/teacher practice. 
      One theoretical concern I would like to address is; do R-I differ qualitatively from the 
famous terms from Schön’s reflection-in-action? If the answer is yes, exactly how can these 
differences be explained and shown? Apparently it seems like Schön’s term action is just 
substituted with intuition. So what may be gained by replacing action with intuition? More 
concretely; what may be gained by introducing abductive, deductive and inductive reflections 
into intuitive awareness? Maybe one answer is to be found in the subtle distinction between 
reflection- and knowing-in-action. For example a skilled performer adjusts his responses to 
variations in phenomena. The performer responds to variation rather than surprise because the 
changes in context and response never cross the boundaries of the familiar (Schön, 1987). 
However, when the boundaries of the familiar is crossed it is time for experimentation and a 
reframing—in action—of what we are doing, says Schön. This is what Schön calls reflection-
in-action; characterised by the fact that it reshapes our thinking and our action while we are 
acting. It seems like reflection-in-action in some ways is fundamental different than knowing-
in-action distinguished by “on-line anticipation and adjustment” and “continuous detection 
and correction of error” (Schön, 1987, p.26). Even though Schön says that R-I-A is not 
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excluded from K-I-A, it seems unclear how they may interact or intertwine. In my view this 
may be a too strong (and unclear) distinction (both theoretically and empirically), because the 
dynamic and concurrent appearance of these phenomena are not sufficiently valued.    
      In other words: when a situation tells us something we did not know before, we have been 
doing some sort of reflection; in Schön’s view either by R-I-A or K-I-A. In the extension of 
Schön’s concepts, I think the framework of R-I (with abductive, deductive and inductive 
aspects) may serve to elaborate and illuminate this ‘some sort of reflection’ and how R-I-A 
and K-I-A may interact. In short, abductive R-I may correspond to reflection-in-action (doubt, 
surprise) and deductive-inductive R-I may be in accordance with knowing-in-action (testing, 
adjustment).   
      Reflection-in-action captures the moments following and preceding a classroom decision 
made by a teacher. In a sense, R-I also takes place in real classroom time as shown by the 
example. However, it is qualitatively different from the uninterrupted flow of knowing-in-
action and reflection-in-action. Unlike, for example, Schön’s (1987) expert reflective 
practitioners, RI teachers not only have a capacity for thinking creatively through reflection, 
but at the same time they also maintain an intense intuitive awareness of potentially-important 
aspects of the situation. 
Practical implications 
What may be gained by emphasizing reflective intuition in management practice? Although 
this paper does not touch deeply upon management and teacher practice, it does seek to offer 
another conceptual system by which to consider management and research (some of the 
implications are first described in Åsvoll 2012). Moreover, it seems that the tacit/explicit 
dichotomy puts too much weight on the process of externalisation or codification although 
more attention should be paid on the question concerning what kind of knowledge is valuable 
in the first place. The teacher’s dialogical and ‘unsecure’ use of abductive, deductive and 
inductive R-I modes may help in order to decide what kind of knowledge which may be 
considered tentatively trustworthy (i.e. objective evaluative or personal phenomenological 
knowledge) in the first place.      
      Obviously, when the teacher expose her actions based on R-I mode she can put herself at 
risk. An awareness that the risk element in RI involves different aspects of knowledge better 
equips a teacher to identify and measure the risks inherent in the situation and to explain the 
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grounds and the RI aspects on the basis of which decisions were taken. A sharper awareness 
of the role that RI plays in evaluating ‘here-and-now’ actions and decisions can contribute to 
an improved understanding of the limitations of both reflective/explicit and intuitive/implicit 
aspects of knowledge. One practical implication is that RI can be used to remedy 
shortcomings in such teaching plans based on a priori reflection and explicit knowledge alone, 
and it can help to create and resolve unpredictable issues. An implication of this is that the 
execution of actions based on RI is often not predictable in advance.  
      Such reflective intuition is a fairly short-term feature, which can be viewed as 
an approach to enable teachers to feel some degree of ‘controlled uncontrollability’ 
over their classes – an aspect often lacked by novice teachers. This ‘controlled 
uncontrollability’ as an expression of a sharper awareness of the importance of RI 
may help teachers and managers to take responsibility for their actions, as there may be no 
explicit knowledge or a priori reflections to support ‘here-and-now’ decisions. 
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i Shotter (2006), who relates Polanyi’s idea of subsidiary awareness to time, suggests that subsidiary awareness 
can provide an ‘anticipatory sense’ of what is to come next in an ongoing process. 
 
